We study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth in a setting where …rms compete in both economic and political markets. Speci…cally, …rms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation and vie for in ‡uence over government transfer policy through rent seeking activities. We …nd that rent seeking a¤ects growth in two ways: it allows …rms to ignore economic competition, leading to less innovation, and alters the number of …rms that are supported in equilibrium. The former e¤ect is negative while the latter is ambiguous. We show how these e¤ects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets.
I Introduction
In the pursuit of pro…ts, …rms seek to gain any advantage over competitors. One way to accomplish this is to invest in research and development (R&D) that may result in the discovery of new products or improved production technologies. It is this innovative activity that drives economic growth. The …rm, by pursuing its own interests, serves society at large by introducing new and improved products or providing existing products at lower cost. But there are other, less productive ways in which …rms can seek an advantage over competitors.
What Baumol (1990) describes as "unproductive entrepreneurship" can take many forms including lobbying, tax evasion, litigation, or theft and can achieve a variety of goals which are pro…table for the …rm, but wasteful from the point of view of society. This type of activity, which is generally referred to as rent seeking, will have important e¤ects on the rate of innovation, the structure of the market and, consequently, on the rate of growth of the economy.
There is no clear agreement in the literature about the empirical relationship between rent seeking and growth. Rent seeking is inherently di¢ cult to measure but Mauro (1995) , using subjective indices of perceived corruption, …nds a negative relationship with economic growth. Bardhan (1997) , on the other hand, identi…es many instances where rent seeking activities have contributed to growth. Whether rent seeking facilitates or hinders growth seems to depend on the political and economic environment.
An important consideration is the channel through which rent seeking a¤ects growth and welfare. The literature on rent seeking and economic performance has focused on two main channels. The private advantage from an innovation is signi…cantly greater when the innovating …rm has monopoly power over the new product or improved technology. Rent seeking activity can then be devoted to ensuring that property rights over the innovation are protected and their value is not diminished by newer technologies. Parente and Prescott (1994) argue that, when monopoly rights are very strong, …rms do not need to innovate in order to maintain market share. If …rms …nd it more pro…table to devote resources to the protection of existing monopolies than to R&D, overall e¤ort in innovation will fall as a result of rent seeking.
1 A second way of ensuring monopoly rights is to prevent the adoption of new technologies. When innovation occurs through a process of Schumpeterian "creative destruction," the owners of pre-existing technologies have an interest in limiting this process. Mokyr (1998) provides ample historical evidence of this resistance to innovation and Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005) model this tension as a dynamic common agency problem between overlapping generations and policy makers. Aghion et. al. (2008) explicitly model rent seeking activity devoted to obtaining government protection from the entry of competitors.
Inherent in these arguments is the assumption that the government can grant perfectly enforceable monopoly rights that restrict the market and create a local monopoly. But it is also the case that …rms in ‡uence government policies that supplement their pro…ts rather than directly block entry. 2 A variety of government activities have this e¤ect, including direct subsidies, tax breaks, loan guarantees, below-market-rate loans, and the provision of subsidized inputs or above market prices through state-owned enterprises. The OECD (2010) documents that these practices represent "a signi…cant amount of public funds." 3 In e¤ect, …rms use the political process to help them survive against competitors -as witnessed in the recent …nancial crisis. This suggests an alternate channel for rent seeking to a¤ect growth and welfare: it can alter market structure in ways that the industrial organization 1 Classic works along these lines include Krueger (1974) , Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) . 2 Campos et. al. (2010) provide evidence that unproductive activities alter the expected cash ‡ows of potential entrants and have an impact on the level of competition in economic markets. 3 For example in the European Union, where controls on "state aids" are strictest, they represented 1% of EU GDP in 2008. If crisis related measures are included, the number triples.
literature argues play an important role in the rate of innovation, including the number and size of …rms. 4 This suggests that a deeper understanding of the relationship between rent seeking, market structure and innovation is required in order to analyze the e¤ect of rent seeking on economic growth.
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We address these issues by introducing rent seeking in a growth model where innovation and market structure are determined endogenously. We de…ne market structure as the number and composition of …rms participating in the market, recognizing that this is endogenously determined and depends on the demand and technological characteristics of markets. Following Peretto (1996 and we consider oligopolistic markets where each …rm carries out two di¤erent activities (in addition to rent seeking): producing a di¤erenti-ated good and carrying out R&D. The latter results in cost-saving innovation for the …rm as well as non-speci…c knowledge that can be used in future R&D. This characterization, combined with the assumption that patent protection is not perfect, implies that …rms will want to carry out R&D in-house and that R&D will have positive spillover e¤ects on the economy. Firms can also participate in rent seeking by dedicating resources to in ‡uence the government for direct transfers which are …nanced through taxation. The model captures two important ideas. First, pro…ts from rent seeking supplement economic pro…ts for …rms and represent a (direct or opportunity) cost to taxpayers. 6 Second, modern corporations conduct productive and unproductive activities concurrently. 7 In this context, the choice between R&D and rent seeking is, therefore, internal to the …rm. The model allows us to study how this choice depends on characteristics of the economic and political markets as well as how decisions on R&D investment and rent seeking feed back into the structure of markets and a¤ect economic growth and welfare.
We consider the joint determination of market structure and the rate of growth in a symmetric model. Market structure has an e¤ect on economic growth because it determines the level of rivalry in the market and in ‡uences the private costs and bene…ts of innovation.
Furthermore, R&D spending makes up one part of …rms' total costs and plays a role in the entry/exit decision. The growth path of the economy depends on the intensity of R&D competition that this interaction generates. Rent seeking plays an important role in this interdependence for three reasons. Firstly, transfers to …rms are …nanced by taxing consumers.
Because …rms are owned by households, we might expect that any pro…ts from rent seeking should make their way back into consumers'pockets. But in free entry equilibrium, pro…ts are forced to zero and the size of the economic market is reduced by the total amount of transfers to …rms. This has a negative e¤ect on the return to R&D and induces …rms to reduce expenditures on innovation, thus leading to lower growth. Secondly, rent seeking has an e¤ect on market structure by changing the incentives to enter the market. In particular, the direct gains from rent seeking increase pro…ts for the typical …rm while the decrease in market size reduces them. The net e¤ect on pro…ts will determine whether rent seeking induces entry or exit, with further repercussions for growth. Thirdly, pro…ts from the political market ensure that …rms are less dependent on pro…ts from the economic market to remain 7 Laband and Sophocleus (1992) document the vast expenditures on transfer activities by …rms (including those aimed at governments) in the US. Publicly available data on lobby expenditures corroborates their …ndings. For example, AT&T spent more than US$36 million in political contributions to …nance the electoral campaigns of candidates in national elections from 1990 to 2006. Microsoft spent US$15 million and Enron US$6.5 million (Source: www.opensecrets.org). O¢ cial data are likely to represent only a fraction of total spending for rent seeking.
competitive. This slack reduces a …rm's incentive to invest in R&D. 8 As in the previous literature, rent seeking has a negative impact on growth through the e¤ect of a shrinking market and the slack provided by political pro…ts. Di¤erently from previous work in this area, this e¤ect can either be reinforced by the exit of …rms or counteracted by entry. A natural question arises: which of these e¤ects is stronger?
The answer depends on the characteristics of both the political and economic markets. In the formal literature, there is no consensus on the type of political market that may best describe the competition for rents. As Bardhan (1997) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) suggest, the way in which corruption and rents are determined varies on a case by case basis. To address this issues, we …rst consider a general market for rents and describe the characteristics that will determine the net e¤ect of rent seeking on growth. We then study a speci…c example based on the classic rent seeking model by Tullock (1980) . By considering three special cases of this model, we are able to highlight the channels through which rent seeking a¤ects economic growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the formal model and section III solves it. In section IV, we establish general results on the e¤ects of rent seeking on market structure, growth and welfare. Section V provides a speci…c example of a rent seeking game.
Concluding remarks follow.
II The Model
Consider an economy composed of a population of L identical consumers with symmetric preferences over di¤erentiated goods supplied by oligopolistic producers. Consumers are endowed with one unit of labor each, which they supply inelastically. The number of …rms is determined endogenously and …rms compete in two markets. In the economic market, …rms engage in two activities. Each …rm produces a good which it sells to consumers. At the same time, each …rm undertakes cost reducing R&D. In the political market, …rms vie for a share of the government's …scal transfer budget. All three activities undertaken by the …rm require the use of labor as an input. The economic market is modeled following Peretto (1996) . 
Consumer Behavior
Demand for each good is derived from the behavior of consumers. We assume that consumers have identical, symmetric preferences over the available varieties of goods. The typical consumer maximizes lifetime utility,
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint A = W + D + rA E T . The individual's discount rate is > 0 and > 1 is the elasticity of product substitution. Per capita expenditure is given by E = P n i=1 p i c i , where p i is the price of good i, c i is consumption of good i and n is the number of goods available. T represents per capita taxes and W is the wage rate that we take as the numeraire and assume equal to unity. Finally, A is per capita asset holding and D represents dividends.
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Households obtain the optimal expenditure plan by setting the time path for expen-9 Readers interested in a deeper discussion of the derivation of the model's equilibrium will …nd it in this reference. 10 In free entry/exit equilibrium, pro…ts will always be zero so that this last term can be omitted without loss of generality. ditures according to : E=E = r and maximizing instantaneous utility subject to per capita expenditure. The resulting demand schedules are given by x i = S i LE=p i , where
is the the share of the market captured by …rm i and
is a price index. It will be useful to characterize demand by the price elasticity of demand,
Production Technology
Each …rm produces output with the following technology:
where x i is the output of …rm i, L x i is labor used in production, and > 0 is a …xed and sunk cost of production. The …rm's knowledge (or patent) stock is given by z i and 2 (0; 1)
is the elasticity of cost reduction. The term z i captures the idea that the marginal cost of production is decreasing in a …rm's accumulated stock of knowledge.
Firms invest in R&D in order to accumulate cost reducing innovations that are patented.
These innovations are speci…c to the …rm, but the R&D process produces knowledge that is useful to other …rms. Technological innovations evolve according to the following condition
where Z i is the stock of knowledge available to …rm i in the innovation process. Taken together, equations (2) and (3) imply that …rms can only use the knowledge they have produced, z i , in …nal good production, but knowledge produced by other …rms helps in the production of new …rm-speci…c knowledge. The parameter 2 (0; 1) determines the share of privately developed R&D that becomes publicly available. The parameter determines how quickly congestion sets in. If the …rm allocates L z i units of labor to R&D in an interval of time dt, it produces : z i new patents. The R&D technology exhibits overall increasing returns to scale and constant returns to scale in knowledge. 11 Pro…ts from the economic market are de…ned as
The Political Market
We model a polity where the government collects lump sum taxes from consumers and uses this common pool of tax revenue to provide transfers to …rms. The key assumption is that the government allocates the revenues to …rms in response to their rent seeking e¤orts. 12 Formally, we assume that …rms dedicate a given amount of labour to in ‡uencing the government. We posit that rent seeking cannot be separated from the other activities of the …rm -in other words, only …rms engaging in production can in ‡uence the government.
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This is meant to capture the fact that modern corporations engage in both R&D and in ‡uence activities.
The government must satisfy the following budget constraint in each period,
where Q i represents the transfer to …rm i, T is the per capita tax on consumers and B is 11 The model can be reinterpreted as having quality-improving innovation, where quality is a continuous variable.
12 As discussed in the introduction, we wish to introduce a general rent seeking structure. This representation will allow us to consider the e¤ect of various di¤erent rent seeking games. In section V we will provide a speci…c example.
13 That …rms are willing to both lobby the government and participate in production can also be explained with a small modi…cation to the speci…cation of the model. If the …xed cost of production, , is interpreted as a …xed and sunk cost of running a …rm (so that a …rm wishing to just lobby the government would also have to pay it), then economies of scope imply that a …rm can lower costs by participating in both markets. the overall budget, that can either be …xed ex ante or endogenously determined. We de…ne a rent seeking "technology"as a function, in the market (n), as is widely discussed in the literature (see for instance Ades and Di Tella (1999) ). At this stage, the only restriction we place on the function f is that it is increasing and concave in L Q i . Pro…ts from the political market can be de…ned as
It is useful to discuss the di¤erences between the market for consumption goods (the economic market) and the market for rents (the political market). Firms compete for favours from the government in a way that is fundamentally di¤erent from the way in which they compete for market share. In the economic market, …rms are oligopolists, o¤ering di¤erenti-ated goods and engaging in Bertrand competition. Competition takes place over prices and …rms can capture market share from their competitors by investing in cost-reducing R&D.
In the political market, …rms compete with each other by trying to obtain the same goodgovernment granted rents. This is, in e¤ect, a game of distribution where the government need not have an inherent preference for one …rm over the other. The economic and political markets are linked, however, by the fact that the total rents paid out by the government must be raised through taxation. This has a negative income e¤ect on consumers, who reduce their demand for all goods. Section III provides a formal treatment of these ideas and studies the e¤ects of rent seeking on market structure and economic growth.
Firm Behavior
For …rm i, the present discounted value of net pro…ts is
The …rm will maximize V i subject to technological and institutional constraints (2), (3) and (5), total demand, and taking as given the number of active …rms and competitors'pricing, innovation and rent seeking strategies. The initial knowledge is assumed to be equal for all …rms.
In symmetric equilibrium, …rm-speci…c subscripts can be dropped. The elasticity of substitution is = ( 1)=n and the stock of knowledge available to each …rm when innovating is given by Z = [1 + (n 1)= (1 + (n 1))] z (n)z; where (n) represents the productivity of labour in R&D. Each …rm's optimizing behavior is characterized by the Bertrand-Nash price strategy, p = [ =( 1)] z , and the optimal level of R&D activity,
Equation (7) captures some important characteristics of R&D in partial equilibrium.
The term LE=n represents the gross-pro…t e¤ect that depends on total sales per …rm and the oligopoly mark-up. The term ( 1) is the business-stealing e¤ect -by investing in cost reducing innovations, …rms lower prices and expand their market share. Spillovers (represented by the term ) have two distinct e¤ects, one negative and one positive. R&D makes their competitors more productive, but they also bene…t from the R&D undertaken by other …rms.
When choosing the optimal amount of resources to devote to rent seeking activity, each …rm equates the marginal bene…t of one additional unit of labor used in rent seeking with its marginal cost. 14 The optimal amount of resources employed in rent seeking can be written
Substituting the optimal rent seeking strategy into Q i , we obtain the equilibrium amount of rents that …rm i can extract from the government. In symmetric equilibrium instantaneous pro…ts are given by
The above discussion describes the Nash equilibrium for a given market size, LE, and number of …rms, n. Since we assume that all …rms start out with the same stock of knowledge, …rms will accumulate knowledge at the same rate and symmetry will be preserved at all times.
III Market Structure and Growth
In order to establish equilibrium market structure, we …rst consider the behavior of …rms taking the number of competitors and the price of labor as given. Firms maximize their stock market value through the choice of pricing strategy, R&D expenditure, and rent seeking expenditure. The entry/exit decision then determines the number of active …rms. Once the behavior of …rms is established, market clearing conditions determine the general equilibrium 14 Notice that the …rm does not consider the e¤ect of its rent seeking activity on total expenditures. This need not be viewed as an assumption, but rather a result of the fact that …rms are price takers in the labor market and take the number of …rms as given. Any pro…ts made by …rms from the rent seeking process will be paid to consumers as dividends and any cost of R&D will be paid to consumers as wages. From the point of view of the …rm, the net e¤ect of rent seeking on expenditures would be zero. of the economy.
Free Entry and General Equilibrium
Consider the entry/exit decisions of …rms. 15 In the absence of entry/exit costs, the number of …rms is a jumping variable and V = 0 at all times. Moreover, stock prices must satisfy the arbitrage condition, rV = e + p + :
V . These conditions imply that pro…ts must equal zero at all time. Together with condition (7), the zero pro…t condition de…nes the Nash equilibrium with free entry, given the interest rate, r, and the size of the market, LE.
By summing the zero pro…t condition across …rms and imposing labor market clearing, per capita expenditures are shown to be E = 1 nQ=L. Notice that rent seeking activities represent a waste of resources and reduce per capita equilibrium expenditures. Since n and E are constant along the balanced growth path it must be the case that r = . The optimal investment strategy (7) can now be written as a function of exogenous parameters and the number of …rms. Substituting this into condition (8) and setting it equal to zero yields the zero pro…t condition,
This condition implicitly determines the equilibrium number of active …rms. 16 Notice that the market structure of this economy depends on the interaction of …rms in the economic and political markets. In particular, rent seeking activities provide an extra source of income to …rms ( p ), but also reduce sales because of the e¤ect of higher taxes on equilibrium expenditures. 17 Condition (9) is depicted in the top panel of Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 about here]
Equilibrium Growth and Welfare
Firms take the number of competitors as given and choose the optimal level of R&D according to condition (7). The equilibrium number of …rms, in turn, is endogenous and determined by the zero pro…t condition (9). The number of …rms is a jumping variable and is constant along the balanced growth path. This implies that the total stock of knowledge available to each …rm grows at the rate Z=Z = L z . Along the balanced growth path, both consumer expenditures and the number of …rms are constant. The rate of cost reduction then determines the growth of output and consumption. Using the zero pro…t condition (9) and the de…nition of growth yields the equilibrium growth rate of the economy
This condition is a modi…ed version of the …rm's R&D decision, where …rms have perfect foresight, correctly perceive the e¤ect of parameter changes on their pro…ts and, based on this, choose whether to be active or not. It therefore shows, for any given number of …rms, the incentive to pursue the innovation that drives economic growth. Together with the equilibrium number of …rms determined by condition (9), this determines the economy's equilibrium growth rate as depicted in the lower panel of Figure 1 .
Welfare in this economy is closely related to economic growth. Integrating the con-17 These results would be slightly di¤erent if it were …rms rather than consumers who paid the tax. The market size e¤ect would not arise. Furthermore, in symmetric equilibrium, the amount of taxes paid by each …rm would exactly equal the transfers received and p = L Q . All other results and comparative statics would be the same. We prefer the assumption that taxes are paid by consumers because …rms extract some bene…t from rent seeking.
sumer's lifetime utility function yields
Welfare is increasing in the number of goods available, in the rate of growth of consumption (which is equal to the rate of cost reduction, g) and in total expenditures.
IV The E¤ects of Rent Seeking
Rent seeking, like market structure and growth, is an endogenously determined feature of this model. In order to analyze the implications of rent seeking on the economic outcomes of interest we will compare the outcomes derived in the previous section to those that would arise if the possibility of rent seeking were eliminated from the model.
Market Structure
In the absence of rent seeking, the equilibrium number of …rms is determined by condition (9) with L Q = Q = 0. The change in the left-hand side of (9) when rent seeking is eliminated
This term represents, for a given number of …rms, the total contribution of rent seeking activity to the …rm's pro…ts. In other words, it represents the shift in the e + p schedule in the top panel of Figure 1 . We see that rent seeking has two e¤ects on the equilibrium number of …rms, which work in opposite directions. The …rst term represents the increase in pro…ts from rent seeking activity, the second represents the loss of pro…ts from a reduction in consumers'equilibrium expenditure brought about by higher taxes.
We can see that the e¤ect of rent seeking on market structure depends on characteristics of both the economic and political markets. The pro…tability of rent seeking, p , relative to the size of rents, Q, provides an incentive for entry. Economic market conditions shape this comparison. The term [1 ( 1)] = captures the fraction of revenues from the economic market that the …rm keeps as pro…ts. The higher this term, the more costly is the loss of market size due to rent seeking. More precisely, notice that this term is higher for lower values of (the elasticity of product substitution) and (the elasticity of cost reduction).
Using the terminology of Bliss and Di Tella (1997), we can refer to and as "deep" competition parameters, because they are demand and technology parameters, respectively, that determine the structure of economic market in the absence of rent seeking. The negative impact of rent seeking on …rms'pro…ts is larger for those industries that are inherently less competitive (i.e. with low and ). This shows the following: Proposition 1. Rent seeking can either increase or decrease market entry. For any given political structure, the negative impact of rent seeking on the equilibrium number of …rms will be larger for an industry characterized by low elasticity of product substitution ( ) and low elasticity of cost reduction ( ).
Equilibrium transfers, Q, and pro…ts from rent seeking, p , depend on characteristics of the political market and on the e¤ects of competition. In general, if rents are large, but the cost of obtaining them is also large so that political pro…ts are small, then rent seeking will have a negative e¤ect on pro…ts and …rms will exit from the market.
Growth and Welfare
To see the impact of rent seeking on growth, …rst de…ne the growth rate (10) when there is no rent seeking (i.e. when L Q = Q = 0) as g nrs . 18 The change in the growth schedule can be expressed as:
For any given market structure, this term represents the direct e¤ect of rent seeking on growth, which is always negative. In terms of Figure 1 , it represents the shift in the g(n)
schedule in the second panel. When pro…ts generated by rent seeking are high, production plays a lesser role in the …rms'equilibrium pro…ts. As a result, there is less of an incentive to invest in R&D and growth is lower for any given number of …rms: the growth schedule shifts down. In other words, political pro…ts provide …rms with slack in the economic market. The greater are political pro…ts, the less pressure …rms feel to cover their …xed costs through economic competition. As long as pro…ts from rent seeking are positive, the growth schedule of the economy will be lower because rent seeking reduces the incentive to innovate for any given number of …rms.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Notice that if the political market were to generate no direct pro…ts for a …rm, the growth schedule would not be a¤ected. This does not, however, mean that rent seeking would not have any e¤ect on economic growth. As shown in the previous subsection, rent seeking a¤ects the incentives to enter or exit the market. The number of …rms plays an important role in determining the incentive to innovate and the growth rate of the economy.
When the pro…ts from rent seeking are larger than the cost in terms of a reduced market 18 Assuming 1 > ( 1) is su¢ cient to prove the symmetry of the Nash equilibrium (see Peretto, 1998 , proposition 1). Under this assumption, one can show that the growth rate of the economy without rent seeking (g nrs ) is positive only for a su¢ ciently large number of …rms and always increasing in n. rent seeking will induce entry. The increase in competition for consumer spending implies an increase of knowledge spillovers, a positive business stealing e¤ect and a negative gross pro…t e¤ect. The …rst two e¤ects always dominate the third and will result in higher R&D spending. The negative e¤ect on growth discussed above will be mitigated, though the total e¤ect on growth is ambiguous. This possibility is depicted in Figure 2 . Alternately, when the cost of rent seeking more than o¤sets any bene…ts, rent seeking will induce exit and growth will be further reduced. This case is depicted in Figure 3 .
[ Figure 3 about here]
The e¤ect of rent seeking on welfare is closely linked to growth. If we again de…ne consumers'lifetime utility (11) in the absence of rent seeking as U nrs , then the di¤erence
shows that the impact on welfare, for a given number of …rms, depends on the impact on growth together with an (always negative) income e¤ect.
The above results are summarized in Proposition 2. Rent seeking has two e¤ects on long-run growth. First, rents reduce incentives to invest in R&D for a given number of active …rms by creating slack in the economic market (direct e¤ect). Second, rent seeking alters the equilibrium number of active …rms, further changing the incentives to innovate (indirect e¤ect). There is an additional negative e¤ect on welfare through the decrease in expenditures.
Graphically, the direct e¤ect of rent seeking is to shift the growth schedule down for any value of n. Rent seeking also alters the equilibrium structure of the market, n (the indirect e¤ect). The interaction of these two e¤ects -i.e. the intersection of the two schedules in 
V A Model of Rent Seeking
Until now we have focused on a very general structure for the market for rents. This section introduces a speci…c model of rent seeking developed by Tullock (1980) . The rent a …rm obtains is assumed to be an increasing function of that …rm's share of total rent seeking activity. The general form of this model can be expressed as:
In terms of the general rent seeking function described in section III, the vector of political market characteristics is now = L Q i ; B; , where L Q i is the vector of rent seeking e¤ort of …rm i's n 1 competitors, B is the exogenous government budget, and > 0 is a parameter measuring the responsiveness of government to rent seeking e¤ort. In each period there is a …xed budget (B > 0) …nanced by lump sum taxation which the government allocates to …rms in response to their rent seeking e¤ort. We therefore have that in each period B = LT = P i Q i . This model is consistent with two aspects of rent seeking that are commonly described in the literature. First, rent seeking is a directly unproductive activity in that …rms dedicate real resources to obtain a pro…t without producing any good or service (along the lines of the directly unproductive pro…t-seeking of Bhagwati (1982) ). Secondly, competition between di¤erent special interests reduces the returns to rent seeking (along the lines of Becker (1983)). 19 This choice further simpli…es the analysis by imposing that the amount available for distribution by the government is …xed: …rms cannot in ‡uence the level of taxation, only their share of the pie. More generally, this speci…cation can be thought of as the reduced form of political model as in Persson and Tabellini (2003) where the parameters are the outcome of an agency model of political accountability. In particular, measures how responsive the government needs to be to certain special interests. The Tullock model also has the bene…t of sharing important characteristics with other interesting rent seeking games. Baye and Hoppe (2003) show that under certain conditions, a Tullock game is equivalent to models of innovation tournaments and race patents.
The game has a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if n=(n 1), so we restrict our attention to this case. 20 The rent seeking literature is concerned with the total rent seeking outlays relative to the value of the contested rent -i.e. the level of rent dissipation. The model speci…ed in (15) allows us to consider two possibilities: full and partial rent dissipation. 21 It is important to note that even though the case of over-dissipation is ruled out in this game, it does not rule out the possibility that in general equilibrium rent seeking will have a negative e¤ect on growth and welfare greater than just the reduction in income. As we show, rent seeking draws valuable resources away from more productive uses.
19 Theoretically the e¤ect of competition on rent seeking is ambiguous. However, Ades and Di Tella (1999) …nd that corruption is higher in economies with fewer number of …rms, thus supporting the idea that competition reduces rent seeking. 20 Whenever > n=(n 1), there is a continuum of Nash Equilibria in mixed strategies, but no pure strategy equilibrium. A general characterization of the equilibria is not available in the literature except for the limit case of ! 1.
21 That over -dissipation is not possible is not a result of our restriction on . Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1994) show that the equilibrium mixed strategies when > n=(n 1) cannot allow for over-dissipation in expectation because this would imply that …rms would have a negative expected payo¤ and would be better o¤ not participating in rent seeking activity at all.
In this sense, our results are similar to those in the 'resource curse' literature. Typically, the decrease in income, growth or welfare that results from an increase in natural resources is not (fully) explained by the assumption of a political contest with over-dissipation, but rather by a re-allocation of productive resources (e.g. Tornell and Lane (1999) , Sachs and Warner (1995) ). Torvik (2002) uses a related rent seeking function to show that a shift in entrepreneurial e¤ort toward rent seeking can explain the resource curse.
Full Rent Dissipation
Full rent dissipation occurs when = n=(n 1).
22 Formally this implies that in a symmetric equilibrium L Q = Q = B=n and p = 0. Condition (12) then becomes
Since pro…ts, for any given n, are lower when rent seeking is allowed, the number of …rms will be lower in a rent-seeking society. The intuition is that rents reduce the size of the economic market (as in the general case). Moreover, political competition between rent seeking …rms fully dissipates their value to …rms. This model allows us to isolate the market size e¤ect of rent seeking since, in equilibrium, rent seeking generates only this cost. Firms …nd themselves in a prisoner's dilemma. They would all be better o¤ if none of the …rms participated in rent seeking, but if this were the case, the incentive for any one …rm to in ‡uence the government 22 The analysis is the same for the case where ! 1. This is referred to as the all-pay auction because the …rm putting forth the greatest rent seeking e¤ort is certain to receive the entire budget and all …rms pay the cost of rent seeking whether they win the contest or not. Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1999) show that there is a symmetric equilibrium where the expected payo¤ for each …rm is zero. There is also a continuum of asymmetric equilibria, but all of these equilibria are payo¤ equivalent so little is lost from focusing on the symmetric equilibrium.
A similar result would obtain if we assume a lobbying a la Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) . Since transfers are lump-sum, the government can costlessly transfer funds between the …rms. This allows it to be able to play them o¤ against each other and extract the entire surplus. Each …rm will increase its "bid" for a transfer in the hopes of beating out its competitors up to the point where there is no bene…t from bidding. is high because having no competition guarantees high returns from rent seeking. All …rms realize this and the result is positive rent seeking expenditures in every period with lower total pro…ts for every …rm.
To see the e¤ect on economic growth notice that condition (13) is equal to zero, since p = 0. There is no direct e¤ect on economic growth because rent seeking does not generate additional pro…ts for the …rm -does not provide any slack -and therefore does not alter the incentive to engage in R&D for a given market structure (i.e. number of …rms). If the market could support the same number of …rms as without rent seeking, the same level of growth would be achieved. However, with the smaller market size resulting from the taxation required to …nance government transfers, a smaller number of …rms will …nd it pro…table to enter the market. Faced with less competition, each active …rm will have less of an incentive to engage in R&D. The result is an unambiguous reduction in growth, as depicted in Figure   4 . This has important implications for the welfare of consumers. Lower expenditures due to taxation shift the equilibrium utility curve (10) down while a lesser variety of goods to consume results in higher prices and reduced growth, leaving consumers unambiguously worse o¤.
Proposition 3. In a Tullock economy with full rent dissipation, rent seeking lowers long-run growth through its negative indirect (market structure) e¤ect. As political pro…ts are zero, no direct e¤ect on growth is present. Welfare is reduced.
This model is of particular interest as a starting point because it isolates the market size e¤ect. The "traditional" (i.e. direct) e¤ect shifting down the growth schedule disappears.
Rent seeking leads to lower growth in equilibrium only through its indirect (market structure) e¤ect. Since …rms compete away all bene…ts from rent seeking and spending on their goods is reduced, pro…ts are lower and the market sustains a smaller number of …rms.
[ Figure 4 about here]
Partial Rent Dissipation
The stark result presented in the previous sub-section is important, but it was achieved by shutting down some important channels through which rent seeking may a¤ect growth.
E¤ectively, competition for transfers was so tough that …rms could not generate positive pro…ts from rent seeking. But if we allow for …rms to gain some advantage through rent seeking, it may induce entry into the market and possibly o¤set the market size e¤ect described above.
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Consider the case where n=(n 1). We will establish that the impact of rent seeking on the economy depends on the interaction between economic and political market parameters. Notice that the larger is , the more the government is responsive to rent seeking.
This parameter can depend on institutional variables such as transparency, accountability of bureaucrats and politicians and, more generally, on the checks and balances on government activity. We can think of as a 'deep'parameter of competition in the political market.
The symmetric equilibrium rent and pro…t from rent seeking are given, respectively, by Q = B=n and p = B=n [1 (n 1) =n]. It is important to highlight the role that checks and balances on the government play in this model. As increases, devoting resources to rent seeking is more pro…table, because the government will provide larger rents for each additional worker employed in rent seeking. However, since this is true for all …rms it induces more rent seeking by all …rms. In equilibrium, this reduces the ability of each …rm to extract resources from the government.
The e¤ect of rent seeking on entry/exit is captured by rewriting condition (12) to re ‡ect 23 It is has been argued, following Posner (1975) , that free entry into the rent seeking game will ensure full rent dissipation -total expenditures on rent seeking equal to total rents. This result does not apply to the present model because rent seeking is not the only thing that …rms do. Free entry will ensure that total pro…ts are pushed to zero, but this does not necessarily imply that pro…ts from rent seeking will be zero. equilibrium values:
The term in square brackets is negative when the government's responsiveness to rent seeking is high or when the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods is low. A su¢ cient condition for the term to be negative is > ( 1)(1 + )= . This condition will hold for higher values of and lower values of . When < ( 1)(1 + )= , the initial (no rent seeking) equilibrium number of …rms matters. In particular, there is a cuto¤ level of n given by = ( (b n) 1)(1 + )= (b n) such that for any initial n nrs < b n the term in the square brackets will be negative and rent seeking will result in exit. This cut o¤ level b n is increasing in and decreasing in so that the condition is again more likely to hold for higher values of and lower values of .
As established in Proposition 1, when consumers cannot substitute freely between goods, …rms can charge a higher price and extract greater pro…ts from every unit of revenue. If this is the case, rent seeking is very costly because the reduction in market size has a more pronounced e¤ect on pro…ts. Exit is also more likely for high values of . As the quality of institutions falls, rents increase but so does the cost of obtaining them. For this reason, rent seeking is more likely to have a negative (general equilibrium) e¤ect on pro…ts. In order for rent seeking to have a positive impact on entry it must be the case that is small relative to . Recalling that we referred to these as 'deep' parameters of competition in the the political and economic markets, respectively, this can be interpreted as saying that rent seeking promotes entry only when political markets are relatively less competitive than economic markets. Only when this is the case does the increase in pro…ts from rent seeking activities more than o¤set the loss of market size.
To see the e¤ect on economic growth notice that the shift in the growth schedule is
Again, since rent seeking generates positive pro…ts for the …rm, the growth rate of the economy is lower for any given n. It can be shown that the growth rate of this economy still is everywhere increasing in n (if positive). More competition in the political market reduces political pro…ts, p , thus providing further incentive for …rms to invest in innovation.
The total e¤ect of rent seeking on growth again depends on the negative direct e¤ect and the indirect (market structure) e¤ect. When rent seeking results in exit, growth will be unambiguously lower.
Proposition 4. In a general Tullock economy, rent seeking increases the equilibrium number of …rms if government's responsiveness to rent seeking activity is low ( < ( 1)(1 + )= ) and the number of …rms supported by the market in the absence of rent seeking is small ( n nrs b n, where b n is implicitly determined by = ( (b n) 1)(1 + )= (b n)), and decreases the number of …rms otherwise. In the …rst case, rent seeking has an ambiguous e¤ect on long-run growth as the indirect e¤ect of rent seeking is positive while the direct e¤ect is negative. In the second case, rent seeking unambiguously lowers long-run growth as both its direct and indirect e¤ect are negative. There is an additional negative e¤ect on welfare through the decrease in expenditures.
Two important implications can be drawn from this analysis. First, it is the interaction between demand characteristics from both the economic and political markets that determine the impact on growth. Secondly, rent seeking will have a positive growth e¤ect only if it induces enough entry into markets that the negative direct e¤ect is canceled out. This would occur only when …rms have little market power over consumers ( high), and are able to extract high rents from every dollar raised by the government ( low), and the market supports few …rms. In other words, rent seeking is good for growth only if there are few …rms engaging in low R&D and they cannot take advantage of consumers or impose too great of a cost on society by extracting rents.
VI Conclusions
A …rm can choose from a variety of strategies in order to maximize pro…ts. Economists have often focused on the way …rms behave in economic markets, but a …rm can also earn pro…ts in the political market through rent seeking. We provide a formal analysis of how this type of unproductive activity can a¤ect economic growth. Firstly, the pro…ts generated by rent seeking provide the …rm with relief from economic competition and dull the incentive to innovate. Secondly, the market structure sustained in equilibrium is altered, further distorting the incentives to innovate. The former e¤ect is consistent with the …nding that aggregate measures of rent seeking and corruption are negatively correlated with economic growth, as in Mauro (1995) . The importance of the latter e¤ect is corroborated by Campos et al (2010) , who …nd that rent seeking activities a¤ect the cash ‡ow of …rms both through the costs involved and the rents received. Furthermore, the change in cash ‡ow a¤ects the entry decision of potential competitors and the pro…tability of incumbent …rms. Perhaps more importantly, the relative impact of rent seeking on …rm entry is conditional on the quality of institutions, as we show in our discussion of the Tullock rent seeking example.
The market structure e¤ect we identify is also broadly consistent with the work of Aghion et al (2008) , who …nd that the quality of institutions can have a di¤erent e¤ect on entry and growth depending on characteristics of the economic market. Although their focus is on democracy as a measure of institutional quality and distance from the technological frontier as the economic characteristic, this result is similar to our …ndings.
The model also provides additional insight into the role that government (…scal) policy plays in economic growth. This role is not dependent on whether government expenditures are useful in production or subject to congestion, but rather based on how competitively …rms vie for the allocation of the …scal budget and the implications this has on the incentives to innovate. Moreover, the model has two clear testable implications. First, in countries where governments are more responsive to rent seeking (i.e. where checks and balances on government activity are weak), rent seeking works as an implicit barrier to entry for new …rms, as rents are o¤set by the large cost of obtaining them. In this case, rent seeking is predicted to have a stronger negative e¤ect on growth due to the resulting lack of competition.
Second, for a given quality of political institutions, in sectors characterized by low elasticity of product substitution, that is where active …rms bene…t from market power, rent seeking lowers entry as the cost of losing market size dominates the bene…t of receiving a net rent.
In these sectors, rent seeking is predicted to have stronger negative e¤ects on growth.
The set of policies which …rms try to a¤ect through rent seeking activity and the set of means they employ to do so are both very large. The …rst includes -but is not limited to -taxes, subsidies (to production, R&D, etc.), barriers to entry and regulation, while the former includes lobbying, bribery and informal in ‡uence. No general theoretical framework can capture all these important features and new insights will likely emerge from future work in this area. However, we believe that our model is a useful …rst step. It provides insights into how the competition for a widely used policy -direct transfers to …rms -a¤ects economic growth through several channels. 
